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Many of the recent discussions of the nature
of the post-colonial State have had very little to
say about the potential effect on the State of
popular political struggles. In contrast, the con-
ventional theories, with which radicals are often
explicitly taking issue, have been very much pre-
occupied with the problem of whether mass
struggles could be accommodated, contained or
controlled within the governmental apparatuses
erected in the terminal colonial period. The
"erosion of the democratic ideal", in Donal
Cruise O'Brien's words, consisted of a declining
conviction among Western social scientists in the
1960s in the resilience and effectiveness of plura-
list ideologies and institutions in this regard in
the 'new nations', and their displacement by
commitments to technologism and authori-
tarianism.
Recent critical theorising, on the other hand, has
been concerned to emphasise the connections
between foreign domination and the national
state apparatuses, via the analysis of continued
(and transformed and often intensified) foreign
economic penetrations, and of the political and
social character of the comprador forces in local
political control. This is a crucially important
task: but the political effects of resting the
analysis there are clear. Firstly, there is a ten-
dency to represent the resulting contradictions as
being between 'national' and 'international' sys-
temsa tendency which, in the case of SQ-called
dependency theories, is no ideological accident;
secondly, it produces a kind of radical pessimism,
often coupled with a voluntaristic and highly
idealised advocacy of 'revolution'. The discussion
below may serve to make this point, albeit in a
very summary form, since it concentrates on the
complex outcomes of intense domestic political
conflicts for states from a region which is almost
archetypally imperialist-dominated. There should
be no need to add, of course, that 'domestic'
politics here means political struggles within
determinate social formations, but struggles
whose forms and movement reflect the nature
of the particular insertion of these formations
into the capitalist world.
The Caribbean as a whole has been going through
intense crisis in recent years The outward signs
are obvious enough: rapid economic and social
decline in the small plantation and monocrop
islands; the conversion of Puerto Rico, despite
its relative 'development', into an apparently
endemically stagnant appurtenance of American
capital; decline of tourism and demand for
mineral exports because of the world recession;
and high and rising unemployment and inflation,
coupled with declining possibilities of emigration
to the industrial cores.' The extreme example
of crisis and decline is provided by Grenada,
where real income per head declined by one-third
in 1974 alone, and where the only significant
economic question, in the words of a militant of
the heavily repressed New Jewel Movement, is
whether the island is in fact owned by Venezuela
or by the Mafia.
It is not only in the smaller and poorer islands,
however, that the rhythms of crisis have been
marked by sharply defined political outcomes:
those parts of the region such as Trinidad,
Guyana and Jamaica, where productive forces
are relatively more highly developed and where
there exist large and organised working classes,
are also the countries where the most evident poli-
tical changes are taking place.
Trinidad and Guyana, in fact, present an interest-
ing contrast in this regard. Both are classified as
'More Developed Countries' in the context of
the Caribbean Community; both depend on a
combination of mineral and agricultural exports
(oil and sugar in the case of Trinidad, bauxite
and sugar in the case of Guyana); both have
roughly the same population (around 1,000,000)
with fairly equal racial division between people of
African and Indian origin. Both countries too
have had very close connections with American
power. The Burnham government's origin, as is
weil known, lay in CIA-supported strikes and
racial upheavals in the early 1960s which dis-
pláced the government of Chedd Jagan, and
Burnham's regime has for years been widely
regarded as operating under a guarantee of
American (and Venezuelan) power. In Trinidad,
the People's National Movement government of
Eric Williams was initially less overtly US spon-
soredindeed in the pre-Independence period
Wffliams' campaign against the US military base
on the island was taken as a sign of anti-Ameri
I A recent, though over-optixnistic. brief survey of a majr
part of the region is provided in E. Hodgkinson, cd..
Development Prosi'ecis and Oetions in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, ODI (London) 1976.
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canisin'but has certainly since the early I 960s
actively encouraged American investment, and
functions as a conservative force in the Caribbean
region as a whole. It was not surprising, there-
fore, that in the first major test of Williams'
strength after Independencethe so-called black
power rebellion of 1970--American naval forces
were on hand should the need have arisen.
But the effect of popular struggles in recent
years has been to push Guyana steadily away
from the imperial umbrella, while the Trinidadian
regime has apparently huddled closer under it.
The explanation for this disparity would certainly
repay systematic investigation: the purpose of
pointing to the contrast here, however, is to em-
phasise Trinidad's different status in the imperial
chain in the Caribbean. Guyana's nationalisation
policy in recent years was in part a measure of
persistent mass support for Jagan and the
People's Progressive Party, repression and sys-
tematic electoral fraud notwithstanding: it may
also be seen, however, as a not undesirable dis-
vestment, from the viewpoint of the bauxite and
sugar companiesand thus a recognition by the
Burnham regime of the internal and external
logic of a move down the 'non-capitalist road'.
Trinidad, however, occupies a more 'privileged'
place in the Caribbean/US context, as will be-
come clearer.
That 'privileged' position held by Trinidad
intensified working class struggles against the
regime and against foreign companies, while in
Guyana strikes and working class rumblings,
particularly those which seemed set to challenge
the existing racially based political dispositions,
thrust the regime steadily, from the early 1970s
onwards, to the point where its structural rela-
tions with US and British capital were altered in
important respects, opening up new political possi-
bilities.
The Trinidadian situation after the onset of the
'oil crisis' in 1973 produced what the earlier
popular rebellion in 1970 had failed to do: it laid
the basis, however fragile, for a racially united
working class challenge to the post-colonial order.
The basis for this intensification of political and
economic struggle has been very quickly grasped
by trade unionists and working class political
militants. The combined effect of inflation! reces-
sion on a world scale and massive increases in
Trinidadian oil revenue (and, to a much smaller
extent, sugar proceeds) was the threat of sub-
stantial deterioration in the position of both
employed workers and the reserve army of the
unemployed, but great opportunities of accumu-
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lation for the components of the dominant politi-
cal alliancebig foreign capital, domestic entre-
preneurs and rentiers, and the neo-colonial petty-
bourgeoisie in particularwith the State playing
a critical distributive role. Although it is true
that a substantial proportion of organised labour
(particularly those in state employment) remains,
through the Trade and Labour Congress, com-
mitted to the PNM Government, the country's
crucial unionsin oil, sugar, transport and sec-
tions of manufacturing services and construc-
tionhave come under the political aegis of the
United Labour Front.
The ULF had its birth in the upheavals in the
cane fields and the sugar industry in Trinidad
in early 1975. The regeneration of the sugar
workers' union and a strong drive to organise
small cane farmers in conditions of rising world
sugar prices resulted in a strike to wrest better
terms from the State and the sugar factories
which coincided with a prolonged strike by oil
workers aginst Texaco in particular. This political
union of oil and sugar workers not only created
a serious industrial situation for the companies
and the regime: it also presented a fundamental
challenge to the bourgeois-dominated racial
parties which drew much of their electoral sup-
port from the Afro-Trinidadian and Indian
working classes respectively. The oil and sugar
workers' strikes and the cane farmers' 'no cut-
ting' campaign ended on less than favourable
terms after the Government had declared a state
of emergency, had mobilised troops to run the
factories and transport petroleum products, and
had even, with the agreement of Texaco, 'nation-
alised' the company's domestic filling stations in
order legally to facilitate strike-breaking by the
military.
The experience, nevertheless, had been of over-
whelming importance. From the early 1950s,
political movements in Trinidad had been based
on carefully cultivated racial hierarchies, spear-
headed by national bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
leaderships. That pattern is still evidently pre-
dominant in the 'Negro' ideological character
of the PNM, and no ULF leader would claim
that it is not still a problematic factor in the
allegiances of the ULF's working-class sup-
porters. Nevertheless, the union of oil and sugar
(i.e. an alliance between the two politically
critical elements of the Afro-Trinidadian and
Indian working classes respectively) had demon-
strated the ULF's viability sufficiently for the
party to be in effect re-mobilised politically early
in 1976. With a more elaborate political pro-
gramme and organisational structure, in Septem-
ber last year the movement displaced the racial
parties and fringe groupings which contested
the Trinidad elections, to emerge as the major
opposition to the PNM.
The ULF had thus, despite its youth and evident
vulnerability, achieved an extraordinary objective
in Trinidadian political conditions. The incor-
porated, racial discourse of the neo-colonial
polity, with its formal nationalism and substan-
tive subservience, its emphasis on the racial
control of the petty spoils of independence, had
been displaced by an ideology which specifically
identifies anti-imperialism as the key to its politi-
cal strategy, with the United States seen as the
primary target and chief ally (through the
agency of the petroleum-linked multinationals in
particular) of the Williams Government. The
possibilities of political change in Trinidad, there-
fore, would seem to rest almost entirely within
the forces represented by the ULF, ambiguous
though some of its political components and
tendencies might as yet be.
The State itself has passed through the populist
phase of neo-colonial integration, and consoli-
dated itself as a structure with extensive involve-
ment in directly productive enterprises (mainly
of junior-partner, infrastructural or declining
kinds) and with comprehensive control functions
for American capital. Two important points
should be noted here: (a) 'American capital' is
overwhelmingly dominated by investment in the
petroleum industry, notably by two oil majors-
Texaco (land-based production and refining) and
Amoco (off-shore production). (b) The Trinidad
State is of growing importance in 'regional' affairs
as a political and economic intermediary for
foreign capital in the Caribbean as a whole. This
role serves not only (or even primarily) the oil
compañies but particularly the large number of
multinationals which have established a manu-
facturing or trading capacity in Trinidad with the
object of penetrating the entire market of the
Caribbean and northern Latin American littoral;
it also serves, let it be said, the 'stabilising' poli-
tical interests of American capital in the region
in general.
The outcome of the crisis in the first place, there-
fore, has been to emphasise the hegemony of
American capital within the Trinidad State and
to underline the subordinate status of 'national
capital' in the dominant political alliance. A
recent and telling illustration of this relation was
provided in the sharp struggle over Trinidad's
currency policy. Despite strong attempts by
national capital from 1973 onwards to unhook
the Trinidad dollar from sterling and hence halt
its downward spiral against the US dollar, this
decision was delayed until May 1976. The effect
of the delay, of course, was severely inflationary,
given the very high import content of dollar
origin. From the point of view of the oil com-
panies, however, the effect was greatly to cheapen
costs of production, particularly since a sub-
stantial part of oil and natural gas development
work incurs substantial local costs, and is hand-
led by sub-contracting systems using local labour
and construction contractors. From the point of
view of the State it meant the accumulation of
vast US dollar balances, since taxes and royalties,
like oil prices, are calculated and paid in US
dollars: this also provided the wherewithal for
an appearance of Government beneficence to
counter the huge increases in consumer prices by
well-publicised subsidies for a range of essential
foodstuffs and other commodities.
More significant in the longer run, however, is the
fact that the effect of the crisis has been to accel-
erate the development of a political forcethe
ULFwhich is not only a direct response to
intensified exploitation of working people, but
also represents the first major possibility since
the labour struggles of the 1930s of a decisive
challenge to the pattern of foreign control of the
Trinidadian economy.
Trinidad may present an untypically clear case,
given the extensive proletarianisation of its pop-
ulation and advanced stage of working class
political and economic organisation. Nevertheless,
it demonstrates rather clearly that such mass
political struggles are not merely factors to be
read off from a 'core-periphery' relation which
is in fact conceived as a capital-capital one, but
are instead the means whereby the principal
contradiction between capital and peripheral
societies is expressed. In particular, Trinidad, and
the intriguing Guyanese comparison, also illus-
trate the manner in which the state apparatus is
itself modified by the movement of that contra-
diction.
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